Written by Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions
The South Atlantic, a region often overlooked in global geopolitics, is quietly becoming a theater of strategic maneuvering, with Britain and Argentina engaging in underreported military dialogue to counter Chinese influence. This development, driven by Argentine President Javier Milei’s pro-Western pivot, could reshape Latin America’s geopolitical landscape, bolster the US-led West’s position in the Southern Cone, and even ripple into the BRICS alliance.
According to an Economist piece, Britain and Argentina have resumed defense talks after years of estrangement, spurred by Milei’s unorthodox stance on the Falklands and concerns about China’s growing footprint in the South Atlantic.
Argentina currently seeks to modernize its dilapidated armed forces with NATO-compatible equipment, while Britain is considering loosening its stringent arms export restrictions, a legacy of the 1982 Falklands War between the two countries. The dialogue, which began warming in February 2024 with British defense attachés visiting Buenos Aires, aims to foster practical cooperation — think training, maritime safety, and Antarctic logistics — while sidestepping the thorny issue of sovereignty of the disputed territories.
The reasoning is: Argentina gains access to Western military technology, and Britain secures a de facto Argentine acknowledgment of its South Atlantic role, thereby enhancing regional security coordination.
This is no easy task, given the historical wounds. One may recall that during the Falklands War, Britain’s preparations were so severe that Margaret Thatcher reportedly considered nuclear options against Argentina. While claims of the UK deploying secret laser weapons in 1982 still lack corroboration, the Royal Air Force (RAF) did draw up plans to bomb Argentine airfields.
No wonder, then, that the Malvinas/Falklands remain a sensitive topic in Argentina, where Milei’s blunt admission, last year, that the islands are “in the hands of the UK” sparked domestic backlash. While domestically problematic, Milei’s approach, bilateral-wise, has been all about de-escalating day-to-day tensions through humanitarian gestures like cemetery visits and resumed flights. It has in fact opened space for such dialogue.
Here, as usual, the broader context is critical. The US, under Trump’s aggressive neo-Monroe Doctrine, is grappling with waning influence in Latin America. Tensions with Mexico, Brazil, and even Colombia could have left Washington searching for a reliable partner in the region — in the strict and peculiar enough way Washington understands what a partner should be.
Argentina, under Javier Milei’s fiercely pro-Western government, is positioning itself as precisely that ally. One should keep in mind this is a leader who has promised to “get rid” of the peso currency by replacing it with the US dollar.
Under Milei, the South American country in fact withdrew from its pending BRICS application. Meanwhile, the US Coast Guard and the Argentine Navy have started joint operations to curb Chinese fishing in the southwest Atlantic.
Perhaps even more significantly, in April 2024, Buenos Aires formally requested NATO Global Partner status, a move which signs an alignment with the US/UK-led security ecosystem. As a Global Partner Argentina could gain access to advanced technology, training, and exercises: in a way a symbolic leap toward NATO integration.
This pivot in fact dovetails with the British-Argentinian talks, as both London and Buenos Aires have voiced concerns about Beijing’s infrastructure projects and about alleged illegal fishing in the South Atlantic, a region critical for Antarctic access and maritime routes like the Strait of Magellan.
As part of its efforts towards a NATO path (enhancing interoperability with the Alliance standards), Argentina also signed an agreement to acquire 24 surplus F-16 fighter jets from Denmark, valued at around $300 million, a deal supported by American financing — the most significant equipment purchase since the country’s return to democracy
Suffice to say, this alignment could reshape Latin America’s strategic balance. Argentina’s NATO aspirations and its negotiations for Danish Iver Huitfeldt frigates reveal Buenos AIres’ intent to integrate with Western defense networks. For the US, Argentina could also serve as a kind of linchpin to counterbalance Brazil and its nuclear submarine ambitions, which, as I noted elsewhere, have historically leaned on Russian cooperation.
This is no light matter. Even someone as staunchly pro-Western as former US President Jair Bolsonaro sought Moscow’s help pertaining to Brazil’s nuclear submarine project in 2022. Brazil’s military has traditionally sought to challenge Anglo-American dominance in the South Atlantic, a project rooted in the 1982 Falklands War’s lessons and aimed at asserting control over the “Blue Amazon”.
Ironically, in 2017, Argentina, under former President Mauricio Macri’, lodged a formal protest with Brazil regarding the landing of British military aircraft at Brazilian airports en route to the Falkland Islands. Five years before, in 2012, Buenos Aires accused the UK of deploying a nuclear submarine to the region, in violation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Such episodes indicate a broader struggle over the South Atlantic’s resources and strategic choke points.
Milei’s recent moves, therefore, risk inflaming tensions with Brazil, which has historically backed Argentina’s Malvinas claims but now sees its neighbor cozying up to its former adversary.
Be as it may, British-Argentinian dialogue is clearly more about strengthening the political West’s presence in the Southern Hemisphere, plus giving Washington’s neo-Monroe strategy a foothold in the South Cone than about healing past wounds.
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