The Next Gen of Russian Military’s Tactics: A Key to Recent Battlefield Successes

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This secret is the key to the Russian army’s success on the battlefield. It is a complete overhaul of warfare methods, abandoning old strategies. This has created more bottlenecks and operational crises for the Ukrainian army.

Over the three-and-a-half years of the Ukrainian conflict, serious changes have been made to tactics and the use of weapons. These will affect how the most developed countries deploy their troops in future combat operations. The emergence of new, inexpensive, mass-produced means of destroying armoured vehicles and manpower will change the course of future wars forever.

The breakdown of old dogmas

In 2022–23, both Russian and Ukrainian units largely adhered to the traditional ‘Soviet’ approach to warfare. At the same time, Kyiv’s Western advisers experimented with a concept developed in the mid-20th century to deter Soviet tank columns advancing towards the English Channel, which they tested on the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This proved somewhat effective, slowing down the Russian advance in northern Ukraine. However, such success was not achieved in the south of the country.

Over the course of the three-and-a-half-year conflict, offensive operations carried out by large armoured forces have had a disproportionately small impact. A striking example is the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ widely publicised counteroffensive, which took place from June to November.

This offensive was jointly planned by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was scheduled to begin in April, but was subsequently postponed. The Ukrainian Armed Forces were given 60–90 days to reach the Sea of Azov. The offensive’s main targets were Melitopol and Berdyansk.

Initial offensive plan

The counteroffensive failed to achieve its objectives. After four months of intense combat, only a small amount of territory was captured. According to various estimates, around 250 tanks were lost, including some Leopard 2 tanks in various configurations supplied to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as at least 700 other vehicles. Personnel losses amounted to around 70,000.

The territories captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are marked in blue

A cluster of destroyed Ukrainian Armed Forces Bradley IFVs and Leopard-2 tanks

The Russian army also sustained significant casualties during the advance of armoured columns in various directions. The failed assault on Ugledar, in which a Russian battalion tactical group was defeated before reaching the city itself, received considerable coverage.

Following a series of failures on both sides, the national armed forces command set about solving the puzzle that had arisen. Judging by the current operational situation on the front, the Russians have outplayed the Ukrainians this time, despite receiving support from the West.

A cheap game changer

The main development in the current conflict has been the widespread and comprehensive use of various drones, ranging from small first-person view (FPV) drones to large strike drones carrying 50 kg or more of explosives. Prior to 2022, the US, NATO, China and Russia had been developing unmanned systems, but it was the war that brought these concepts to fruition.

The battlefield was swarming with various unmanned systems. Large UAVs conducted reconnaissance deep within opposing operational formations while small quadcopters coordinated the actions of infantry on the ground, guided FPVs and directed artillery fire. On the ground, wheeled platforms supply frontline assault groups and evacuate the wounded. However, the most important factor in all of this remains the human element.

Delivering ammunition and provisions under hostile fire

Regardless of whether they are light infantry fighting vehicles or heavy tanks, most armoured vehicles have ceased to fulfil their primary task of protecting soldiers from weapons of destruction. Throughout the entire conflict, no cheap, mass-produced means of effectively countering strike UAVs has emerged. Armoured vehicles in the strike zone of drones have more than a 70% chance of being destroyed.

An area of land cannot be considered occupied without soldiers occupying it. No matter how dominant aircraft and drones are in the air, the area will remain in a ‘grey’ zone. This was confirmed by the course of the US war in Vietnam.

Reverse the Game

Tactical Level

The Russian command’s main dilemma was how to assemble and deliver an assault group directly to the Ukrainian’s line of defence. Such attempts are often thwarted by both sides during loading and advance. The army loses soldiers and armoured vehicles, and the task remains unfulfilled. Neither Russia nor the NATO countries have the production capacity to sustain such heavy losses of armoured vehicles in a prolonged conflict. Personnel are currently extremely valuable.

The way out of the current situation is obvious, albeit counterintuitive. The Russians are now using two parallel tactics for deploying units and sub-units in an offensive.

It is important to note that serious fire preparation is carried out before either of the two tactics described below is used. First, a ‘kill zone’ is created — a strip of continuous destruction of hostile objects — which isolates the target (the opponent’s stronghold) from outside help. Drones play a special role in this process.

The first involves an assault carried out by a large number of small, manoeuvrable groups. For instance, one or two sections could be selected from a motorised rifle platoon, with the soldiers being divided into combat pairs and trios. The second part of the platoon comprises a command and fire support group. The assault troops are loaded onto fast, manoeuvrable transport and advance. Enduro motorcycles, especially electric ones, have proven to be the most effective due to their quietness, which allows the troops to attack with the element of surprise.

Model for the attack team

The command and fire support group accompanies the assault troops, providing them with target designation and transmitting direct commands via a reconnaissance drone. If necessary, FPV drones or quadcopters carrying combat payloads are deployed to support the advancing troops.

This is an example of how quadcopter control enables a fighter to coordinate their actions

Once the assault is complete and the nearby hostile UAV control points have been suppressed, the main forces advance to the captured point. Once they have secured their positions, they prepare for the next thrust.

The second is infiltration. Unlike in previous wars, the front line does not currently consist of a continuous network of trenches and fortifications. There are so many drones per square kilometre of the front line that their total number exceeds that of the soldiers and equipment located there. This leads to a huge number of unjustified losses due to the concentration of military personnel in a narrow area.

At the current stage of the conflict, the front line consists of a series of small, scattered fortified areas, defended by units no larger than a platoon and, more often than not, a squad. The distances between these points often exceed direct visibility. This enables small groups to infiltrate the Ukrainian ‘s defences without engaging in combat. The main emphasis is on stealth and air supply to frontline groups.

This tactic was first employed by the Russian army during their breakthrough at Dobropillya. Over the course of several weeks, groups of two to three people, adhering to the strictest camouflage protocols, infiltrated Ukrainian defences by more than ten kilometres. The assault groups were supplied with food and water by air using quadcopters. Since movement mainly took place at night, drones equipped with thermal imaging cameras guided the assault troops to avoid Ukrainian positions. Anti-thermal imaging cloaks were also widely used to hide from opposing drones. At the appointed time, all the hidden assault groups sprang into action.

The effect was so unexpected by the Ukrainian command that a serious operational crisis arose. The most highly trained firefighting team in the Ukrainian army — the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard, also known as ‘Azov’ — was deployed to resolve the situation. Fighting for the Dobropillia salient has been ongoing for two months, with the Ukrainians unable to dislodge the Russians from their positions. Attempts to ‘cut off’ the salient by striking through Vladimirovka and Belitskoye on 20 October were unsuccessful, and the Ukrainians exhausted their reserves.

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Operational level

Russian military science largely relies on tactics that were developed during the Soviet era. According to combat regulations, one of the most effective ways to defeat the enemy is to encircle them.

However, in the current conditions, this tactic carries extremely serious costs. A large number of forces are required to hold both the outer and inner perimeters when creating an encirclement. When surrounded, the adversary will always try to break through the encirclement with two counterattacks at the ‘thinnest’ point. This means that losses among the forces surrounding the enemy will be extremely high.

The Russian command has refined this tactic, which has proven highly effective. They are in no hurry to ‘close the lid on the pot’, leaving a narrow bottleneck through which supplies can reach the half-encircled Ukrainian group. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are given the false impression that they can withdraw their troops relatively safely from the encirclement being prepared. However, the remaining route of retreat is under complete Russian fire control.

The following are striking examples of the Russian army’s operational mastery:

• The current situation in Pokrovsk and Mirnograd.

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• The trend to the east of Kupyansk.

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• Tactical success in the Shakhovo area.

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Russian military doctrine has evolved during the conflict, enabling the country to adapt to changing conditions. The successes of the winter and summer campaigns of the past year are directly linked to the use of new operational and tactical methods of warfare. These innovations enable a steady, if not rapid, advance along most sections of the front. The emergence of operational crises only worsens the situation for the Ukrainian army, forcing it to deploy its already limited combat-ready reserves.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

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• Bridgehead On The Yanchur: Russian Troops Expand Control On Western Bank
• Beyond the Front Lines: How Ukraine’s Training System Challenges Mobilized Soldiers

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